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FOREWORD-THE LEGAL ETHICS
SCHOLARSHIP OF TED SCHNEYER:
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING RIGOROUS
Bruce A. Green*
This collection on "Lawyer Regulation for the 21st Century" celebrates
Ted Schneyer's legal ethics scholarship. From my perspective as Ted's friend and
colleague in the field of legal ethics, it is obvious how richly he deserves this
festschrift, and it is my privilege to be invited to contribute its foreword. But to
someone outside the field, many questions might be raised. Why celebrate legal
scholarship? Why celebrate legal ethics scholarship? Why celebrate Ted
Schneyer's legal ethics scholarship? And why celebrate it by collecting writings on
the theme of Lawyer Regulation for the 21st Century?
Though I have no desire to put a damper on the celebration, it strikes me
that no one writing in the field of legal ethics has been more questioning, more
probing, more skeptical than Ted. Therefore, what better way is there to celebrate
his contributions than by asking why we are celebrating them and why we do so in
this manner?
Let me start with the last question. "Lawyer Regulation for the 21st
Century": what makes this a fitting theme for a collection in Ted's honor? Two
things, actually.
First, although lawyer regulation is a wide and ever-expanding landscape,
Ted has captured it with extraordinary discernment over the course of a career that
has spanned more than three decades. The legal profession's regulatory framework
consists of all the institutions that create norms for lawyers, the institutions that
interpret and enforce those norms, and the processes by which these institutions go
about doing so. That has been Ted's principal subject. A century ago, lawyers
were primarily regulated by state courts and bar associations. State courts adopted
ethics rules based on an American Bar Association (ABA) model code; bar
* Louis Stein Professor of Law and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and
Ethics. Fordham University School of Law.
1. Ted Schneyer, How Things Have Changed: Contrasting the Regulatory
Environments of the Canons and the Model Rules, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 161, 161; see also
Theodore J. Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and
Enforcement, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 939, 939 (1980) ("Regulating lawyers is a three-part
process. Rules must be formulated, they must be interpreted, and they must be enforced.").
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associations and courts then interpreted the rules and enforced the rules in
disciplinary proceedings. But, to the ABA's consternation, institutions external to
the legal profession have become increasingly prominent regulatory forces by
adopting and enforcing other bodies of regulatory law. Ted has charted their
development and rise. In particular, as law practice has become more specialized
since the 1960s, federal regulation of lawyers has become increasingly important.2
Examples Ted noted several years ago in an article on regulatory developments
include the Justice Department's use of criminal law to police bankruptcy,
securities, and tax lawyers, among others; the application of federal consumer
protection law to lawyers; and the statutes and regulations aimed specifically at
bankruptcy, securities, and tax lawyers.
3
Ted would call himself an "institutionalist." He pays particularly close
attention to the operation and role of the institutions that regulate lawyers. How
well do they do their regulatory jobs? Which institutions are more competent to
make a rule or law governing lawyers4 or to enforce one on any given subject? 5 As
might be expected, bar institutions responsible for adopting, interpreting and
enforcing professional norms are most prominent among those that he has
scrutinized. While federal agencies and other institutions have assumed previously
unaccustomed roles in lawyer regulation, the bar maintains and has sought to
preserve a significant and perhaps dominant regulatory role. Ted has given
particular attention to bar institutions' regulatory roles and how they have
evolved.6
For instance, Ted has studied the ABA as a rulemaking body. This was
the focus of his 1989 tour de force, "Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making
2. Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation
of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 559, 566 (2005).
3. Id. at 573-82.
4. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Who Should Define Arizona's Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege?: Asserting Judicial Independence Through the Power to Regulate the
Practice of Law, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 419, 452-58 (2006) (concluding that the state court is
better situated than the state legislature to adopt rules governing corporations' attorney-
client privilege, in part because the judiciary is more competent to coordinate the privilege
with other law, less susceptible to institutional bias with regard to the relevant interests, and
more respectful of the trans-substantivity principle, and that the state court should invoke its
exclusive authority to regulate law practice to supersede legislation on this subject).
5. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of
Lawyers' Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 371, 373-74 (1998) (comparing
the capacities of different institutions to enforce restrictions on legal fees).
6. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law
Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure'" of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 245 (1998); Ted
Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis Means for the
Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 639 (1994); Ted Schneyer, Professional
Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1991); Ted Schneyer, Professional
Discipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 125 (1991); Theodore J. Schneyer,
The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case, 8 AM.
B. FOUND. REs. J. 1 (1983); Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent UK.
and Australian Reforms with US. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice, 2009 J. PROF.
LAW. 13.
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of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,"7 which is a political account of the
six-year process leading to the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules. While the
account is ultimately sympathetic in its depiction of the drafters' openness to
competing professional viewpoints, it also demonstrates the extent to which
professional subgroups sought to exploit the opportunity to shape the rules to their
ends.8
Bar politics has been one of Ted's abiding scholarly interests, 9 and when
he returned to the ABA's ethics rulemaking role in a significant piece published in
1993, his account was less sympathetic. 10 This time, he examined the 1991"ancillary business debate"--the debate within the ABA over whether the Model
Rules should permit lawyers to own or operate businesses providing non-legal
services, such as environmental consulting services, which are ancillary to the
practice of law. Ted analyzed the rhetoric successfully employed by opponents of
ancillary businesses. He showed that their rhetoric, centering on considerations of
"professionalism," distracted the ABA leadership from the kinds of questions that
should go into good public policymaking-for example, what are the perceived
risks of ancillary businesses, what does data show about the magnitude of those
risks, how can the risks be reduced, and whether the benefits outweighed the
costs. 11
Ted has also studied the ABA as an interpreter of professional norms. In
1981, he and his Wisconsin colleague, Ted Finman, published the first
comprehensive critique of the work of the ABA standing committee that issues
opinions interpreting the provisions of the ABA's model ethics code. The article
was quite critical of both the committee's writings and the process by which they
were produced. (Around a quarter century later, Ted spent a few years as the
AALS (Association of American Law Schools) representative to the committee,
and I was also a member. I think Ted would agree that, by then, both the
committee's product and its process had improved considerably, and I would not
discount the possibility that Ted's article played some role in inspiring that
development.)
Likewise, Ted has examined bar associations' disciplinary role, which has
largely been superseded by the work of independent disciplinary agencies
supervised by state courts. In 1983, he published a definitive, comprehensive
account of unified bars-that is, bar associations in the minority of states that
require their lawyers to join, in contrast to the more prevalent voluntary bar
7. Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
8. Id. at 700-01.
9. See, e.g., Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments, supra note 2,
at 564; Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 305-10 (2008).
10. Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's
Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 363 (1993).
11. Id. at 366, 372-90. The article speculated that "the crusade against ancillary
business" was a reaction to an identity crisis in the legal profession occasioned by cultural
changes, id. at 391-92, and suggested that the "cure for this policymaking disease" would
be adherence to "principles of tolerance and careful inquiry in future debates." Id. at 393.
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associations. The unified bars arose in the early twentieth century largely out of the
expectation that their responsibility for lawyer regulation would lead to better
admission and disciplinary standards and practices. 12 Focusing on Wisconsin's
experience, Ted showed convincingly that the preservation of unified bar
associations is not justified by their regulatory role, nor by their role in promoting
law reform or by any other contribution, particularly given political and legal
challenges and other costs of maintaining them.
At the same time, while not discounting the bar's importance, Ted has
been a leader in recognizing that other institutions loom increasingly large on the
regulatory landscape.1 3 He has marked the shift from professional self-regulation
to external regulation of legal practice by studying how lawyers are governed by
institutions aside from bar associations and state courts.
Some of Ted's writings look at the regulatory role of government
institutions other than state judiciaries. An example is Ted's 1994 article on the
regulatory response to lawyers' alleged failings in connection with the Savings &
Loan Crisis. Ted began with the observation that "in contrast to the barrage of
lawsuits and enforcement actions launched against S&L lawyers, nearly all had
been quiet on the disciplinary front., 14 He asked why. Why had professional
disciplinary bodies essentially played no role, and what was the significance of the
regulatory role undertaken by a federal administrative agency, the Office of Thrift
Supervision, which initiated civil actions to hold some of the lawyers accountable?
The article described the limitations of the disciplinary process and ethics codes
that made them inadequate to the regulatory task at hand. Drawing on the political
concept of corporatism-the development of laws governing an occupation
through negotiation between the government and the occupation's leading
membership association-Ted predicted that in the future, standards of conduct
would be developed for lawyers through what he termed "bar corporatism," that is,
through negotiations or dialogue between government agencies and the ABA.15
Ted has also emphasized that lawyers are regulated informally by private
actors. These include external actors, such as malpractice insurers. But lawyers are
also regulated, informally but significantly, by the private institutions, including
the law firms, in which they work. This insight is a predicate of Ted's influential
1991 Cornell Law Review article, in which he argued that professional discipline,
which until then could be imposed only on lawyers individually, should be
extended to law firms. 16 Ted recognized that law firms have a significant role, for
better or worse, in regulating the conduct of their lawyers, and that they would be
encouraged to regulate better if they were themselves subject to professional
12. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept, supra note 6,
at 15-18.
13. Schneyer, How Things Have Changed, supra note 1, at 161-62.
14. Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism, supra note 6, at 640.
15. Id. at 658.
16. Schneyer, Professional Disciplinefor Law Firms?, supra note 6, at 8-11; see
also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline,
16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 336 (2003) ("Schneyer's arguments have profoundly
influenced subsequent debate about law firm discipline. Indeed, it is difficult to find a law
review article or bar debate on the subject that does not begin with Schneyer's article.").
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discipline, just as corporations are subject to criminal prosecution based in part on
a principle of vicarious liability.' 7 His article was the first to employ the idea of a
law firm's "ethical infrastructure"-meaning the "organization, policies, and
operating procedures" of a law firm that influence its lawyers' professional
conduct -a concept that is now commonly employed in the academic and
professional literature. Ted argued that, for the same reasons criminal law applies
to corporations, disciplinary rules should be applicable to law firms. He further
argued that alternative regulatory mechanisms such as "malpractice litigation,
disqualification, civil sanctions, peer review, and [administrative] oversight" had
gaps and limitations that professional discipline would fill. 19 In the wake of the
article, two states-New York and New Jersey-have been persuaded to adopt law
firm discipline.20
All of this is simply to say that, if one seeks to honor Ted Schneyer's
prodigious scholarly contributions, as his colleagues have done, it makes sense to
do so with a collection on lawyer regulation. But why focus on lawyer regulation
in the 21st Century? That brings me to the second reason why the theme of this
festschrift is so apt.
When it comes to 21st Century lawyer regulation, Ted got a head start on
the rest of us. He tackled the subject in an essay entitled "Professional Discipline
in 2050: A Look Back," published in 1991, nine years before the dawn of the new
century and fifty-nine years before its midpoint, which Ted took as his vantage
point.21 In Ted's description, American lawyers in the year 2050 would be allied in
mega-firms with accountants and other professionals;22 "the sole practitioner," he
predicted, would be "as extinct as the bald eagle., 23 Additionally, Ted painted a
regulatory landscape in which lawyers would be federally licensed and regulated
24
and in which regulators would focus "on entities as disciplinary targets" rather
than on individual lawyers,25 a result foreshadowed by his aforementioned 1991
Cornell Law Review article on law firm discipline.26
Ted's article on professional discipline in the mid-twenty-first century
was somewhat whimsical, but as a general matter, Ted has been a trend spotter, if
not a time traveler. Many of his writings survey the changing nature of law
17. Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, supra note 6, at 27-31.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id. at 23-45.
20. Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the
Anti-Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1469, 1473 (2000).
21. Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050, supra note 6. On second thought,
a collection of writings on "Lawyer Regulation for the 21st Century" may be too
nearsighted to honor Ted sufficiently. Fewer than ninety years remain in the twenty-first
century. Perhaps, in the spirit of Ted's farsighted essay, we should be contemplating lawyer
regulation for the 22nd Century and leaving the next nine decades to the unimaginative and
unambitious among us.
22. Id. at 129.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 125-28.
25. Id. at 131.
26. Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, supra note 6, at 8-11.
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practice and ask what the changes portend for the future of lawyer regulation.27 His
prediction of the rise of bar corporatism,2" already noted, is one example, but there
are important others. One that should garner renewed interest is a 2000 Minnesota
Law Review article in which Ted took it as a given that the ABA would eventually
amend its rules to permit lawyers to practice in multidisciplinary partnerships
(MDPs)-that is, professional service partnerships between lawyers and
nonlawyer professionals. 29 Ted posed the question of what future regulation of
MDPs would look like; in particular, whether it would be possible to prevent and
remedy nonlawyers' interference with lawyers' exercise of independent
professional judgment. The article cast doubt upon the notion that professional
regulation, such as through certification or audits, as then anticipated by the ABA,
would be effective. It concluded that the most significant regulatory mechanisms
would be internal controls developed within the MDPs themselves and ex post
liability. Although MDP proposals were defeated a decade ago, Ted's insights
have become relevant again. The ABA's Ethics 20/20 Commission-recently
appointed to evaluate lawyer regulation in light of globalization and evolving
technology-now has the opportunity to reevaluate professional partnerships
between lawyers and nonlawyers. Happily, Ted was appointed to the Commission,
and so at least one member will be familiar with his work.
Ted's writings are far too extensive to review completely, or even nearly.
He has written about conflicts of interest, 30 contingent-fee contracts 31 and
attorney-client privilege; 32 collaborative divorce lawyers, 33 corporate lawyers34
27. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on
Large Law Firms: A Comparative Perspective, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 593, 594 (2002)
(contrasting techniques for regulating large-firm practice with those aimed at solo and
small-firm practitioners, in part because of the distinctive source of large firms' ethical
problems); Ted Schneyer, Nostalgia in the Fifth Circuit: Holding the Line on Litigation
Conflicts Through Federal Common Law, 16 REV. LITIG. 537, 540-46 (1997) (criticizing
disqualification case law responding to litigation conflicts in an era of growing federal
litigation involving sophisticated corporate clients); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism and
Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 449, 458-59 (1988)
(exploring the development of law occasioned by the growth of in-house counsel); Ted
Schneyer, Reputational Bonding, Ethics Rules, and Law Firm Structure: The Economist as
Storyteller, 84 VA. L. REV. 1777, 1777-79 (1998) (critiquing economics-based arguments
that certain rules of legal ethics are unduly limiting law firms' growth and other structural
change); Ted Schneyer, The Regulatory Implications of Trends in Law Practice: Thoughts
on the Data Reported in Urban Lawyers, 2006 PROF. LAW. 47, 47-49 (considering the
regulatory implications of the American Bar Foundation's (ABF) second Chicago bar study
as compared with its earlier one).
28. Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism, supra note 6, at 671-
76.
29. Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 20, at 1476.
30. Schneyer, Nostalgia in the Fifth Circuit, supra note 27.
31. Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints, supra note 5.
32. Schneyer, Who Should Define Arizona's Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege?, supra note 4.
33. Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement, supra
note 9.
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and white-collar defense lawyers; 35 professional reforms in Australia, the U.K.,
and the United States;36 and so much more. He gives us both the trees and the
forest; he scrutinizes particular aspects of lawyer regulation to make bigger points
about where we are and where we are going. Even so, the above sampling of Ted's
scholarship should be enough to make the small point that, if one is to celebrate
Ted's works, the regulation of the legal profession in the twenty-first century is a
fitting theme.
But that leaves the tougher questions. In recent years, some have
challenged the value of legal scholarship altogether. Two decades ago, Judge
Harry Edwards famously worried that legal scholarship was becoming less
relevant to what lawyers and judges do,37 and more recently, federal circuit judge
Dennis Jacobs one-upped him by declaring that he never reads law review articles
because they are completely irrelevant to judges.38 So why celebrate legal
scholarship at all?
And why celebrate legal ethics scholarship in particular? Legal ethics is a
sometimes maligned academic field. Most infamously, in the last Supreme Court
term, Justice Scalia took a shot at it in his dissent in Holland v. Florida.39 The case
involved a criminal defendant named Holland whose lawyer failed to file a timely
petition for post-conviction relief in federal court.40 The question for the Supreme
Court was whether, under the particular circumstances, the statutory time period
within which Holland had to file his petition should be tolled on equitable grounds.
A group of legal ethics professors, Ted among them, filed a friend-of-the-Court
34. Ted Schneyer, Fuzzy Models of the Corporate Lawyer as Environmental
Compliance Counselor, 74 OR. L. REv. 99 (1995); Schneyer, Professionalism and Public
Policy, supra note 27.
35. Ted Schneyer, Getting from "Is" to "Ought" in Legal Ethics: Mann's
Defending White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 903 (1986) (book review).
36. Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility, supra note 6.
37. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 34-42 (1992).
38. Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews
Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 ("'I haven't opened up a law review in years,'
said Chief Judge Dennis G. Jacobs of the federal appeals court in New York. 'No one
speaks of them. No one relies on them."').
39. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
40. Id. at 2554. Holland was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Id at
2555. After his conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal, he engaged a lawyer to
move for post-conviction relief in state court and, if that failed, in federal court. Id. Holland
sent repeated communications to his lawyer as well as to the courts to try to ensure that the
lawyer did what he agreed to do, which the defendant, confined on death row and
unschooled in the law, was not well-situated to do for himself, which was simply to file a
petition on time. Id. at 2555-56. However, after state court proceedings ended
unsuccessfully in the Florida Supreme Court, id at 2556, Holland's lawyer failed to file the
federal claim within the statutory time limit. Id. at 2559. This was not just the result of a
simple mistake about when a petition had to be filed; the lawyer had not researched the
filing requirement. Id. at 2558. Beyond that, the lawyer did not notify the client when the
state supreme court ruled against him despite Holland's requests to be told, and the lawyer
generally failed to respond to requests for information, making it impossible for Holland to
correct for his lawyer's deficiency. Id. at 2557-59.
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brief describing how the lawyer's conduct violated professional norms regarding
attorney competence, diligence, and communications with the client. The Court's
opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, graciously referenced the amicus brief.
Justice Scalia's dissent was not quite as friendly. He criticized the Court's implicit
approval of professional norms "articulated by an ad hoc group of legal-ethicist
amici consisting mainly of professors of that least analytically rigorous and hence
most subjective of law-school subjects, legal ethics."
41
To respond to Justice Scalia first: legal ethics is no more subjective than
any other legal academic subject.42 Legal ethics professors study and teach
regulation that is like any other regulation, except that it happens to apply to us as
lawyers. The subject produces scholarship that employs the methodologies of other
legal scholarship, and no less rigorously.
One need look no further than the writings of Ted Schneyer. I would
happily select him as our legal ethics champion and invite Justice Scalia to
compare Ted's writings on legal ethics to those of legal academics on other
subjects. Ted asks interesting, important questions and explores them deeply,
building on evidence. He draws insights from other disciplines-legal history,4
3
the sociology of the professions,44 law and economics,45 empirical studies,46
organization theory,47 moral and political philosophy 4 -and in so doing,
contributes to those fields at the same time he contributes to the field of legal
ethics.
And Ted is nothing if not rigorous. In fact, some of Ted's most satisfying
works are those that employ a rigorous inquiry to expose the intellectual laziness
of others both in the profession and in academia. His work, already noted, on the
rhetoric employed by bar leaders in the ancillary business debate is one example,
but hardly the only.
41. Id. at 2575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
42. This is not to say that law is objective in the way that math and hard sciences
are. Well-trained lawyers can look at a close question and come up with very different
answers, as the many non-unanimous Supreme Court decisions reflect.
43. See, e.g., Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept, supra note
6; Ted Schneyer, Change and Persistence in the Bar President's Speech, 41 MERCER L.
REV. 581 (1990).
44. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of
Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1529; Ted Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and the ABA 's
Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 25, 42 (1993); Schneyer, Getting
from "Is " to "Ought'" in Legal Ethics, supra note 35.
45. See, e.g., Schneyer, Reputational Bonding, supra note 27.
46. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Empirical Research with a Policy Payoff: Market
Dynamics for Lawyers Who Represent Plaintiffs for a Contingent Fee, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1829
(2002); Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement, supra note 9;
see also infra text accompanying notes 49-53 (discussing response to moral philosophers).
47. See, e.g., Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept, supra note
6; Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, supra note 6.
48. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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My own favorite is Ted's well-known article "Moral Philosophy's
Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics., 49 Although Ted has never been
interested in writing about legal ethics doctrine per se, he has written many
interesting works that, at least in substantial part, explore the nature of professional
rules and norms,50 and this is one of them. It takes on moral philosophers who
have attacked the profession's ethics rules for purportedly compelling lawyers to
act as their clients' "hired guns" without regard to lawyers' own moral values or
the interests of third parties. Showing that an ounce of empiricism is worth a
pound of theory, Ted draws on sociologists' studies to refute the assumption that
lawyers characteristically act as hired guns. And showing that generalizations
about professional norms may be belied by a careful reading of the ethics rules,
51
Ted makes a convincing case that, insofar as lawyers do act as hired guns, they are
often violating ethics rules, and certainly are not acting under the rules'
compulsion.
Along the way, Ted's response to the moral philosophers offers an
observation that captures both Ted's elegant writing style5 2 and his spirit of
scholarly inquiry. He expresses disappointment that the philosophers who criticize
the legal profession and its norms:
49. Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception, supra note 44.
50. See, e.g., Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism, supra note 6,
at 666-67 (demonstrating that the potentially applicable Model Rules were too
indeterminate to be applied to the lawyers whose conduct was questioned in the Savings &
Loan Crisis); Schneyer, How Things Have Changed, supra note 1, at 172-78 (showing how
the 1908 ABA Canons and the 1983 ABA Model Rules reflect differences in the nature of
lawyers' practices and workplaces and in the relationship between disciplinary rules and
external law); Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics, supra note 7, at 677-81
(comprehensive account of the drafting of the ABA Model Rules); Schneyer, The ALI's
Restatement and the ABA's Model Rules, supra note 44; Schneyer, The Model Rules and
Problems of Code Interpretation and Enforcement, supra note 1.
51. Or, as Yogi Berra said, you can observe a lot by watching. See generally
YOGI BERRA & DAVE KAPLAN, You CAN OBSERVE A LOT BY WATCHING (2008). Another
illustration is Ted's 1986 response to an essay by Erwin Chemerinsky criticizing
professional responsibility courses and casebooks on the ground that they are incompatible
with the objective of encouraging critical thinking about the lawyer's role in society, how to
recognize and resolve ethical issues that lawyers face, and the regulation of the legal
profession-objectives that Ted embraced in teaching the subject. Ted gave the casebooks
in question a close reading to demonstrate that many of Chemerinsky's characterizations
were "simply incorrect." Ted Schneyer, Professional Responsibility Casebooks and the New
Positivism: A Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 10 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 943, 953 (1985).
52. I had the privilege of serving with Ted on the Multistate Professional
Responsibility drafting, which relied on him to resolve tough grammatical questions. One of
the joys of reading Ted's articles is that he not only can make nouns and verbs agree, he can
turn a phrase. See, e.g., Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism, supra note 6,
at 645 (observing that while federal agencies netted $147 million in settlements against law
firms alleged to have acted improperly in representing financial institutions, "[n]o such pot
of gold lies at the end of the disciplinary rainbow"); Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and
the ABA 's Model Rules, supra note 44, at 30 ("Of course, the Restatement is not just an
ethics code in drag. It is designed to cover in depth many topics that the ABA codes do not
address or only touch upon."); see also infra text accompanying note 53 (quoting Ted's
reply to moral philosophers).
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approach their subject in a temper that blinds them to the possibility
of learning anything of use to non-lawyers. They find nothing of
general value in the way lawyers address their ethical problems, and
no solutions to specific problems which would be valuable as
analogies in other ethical domains. This is not only curious, since in
other respects philosophers have been eager to generalize from their
study of law and legal institutions, but regrettable as well. Because
law practice so frequently involves moral risks, lawyers' reflections
on ethics just might contain, like law itself, a vein of hard-won
understanding that philosophers could mine for the benefit of non-
lawyers. But mining cannot be expected from those who come to
new territory as missionaries rather than prospectors. And
missionaries bent on converting the bar are what the philosophers
have mostly been.53
In contrast, Ted has examined the legal profession, its regulatory
institutions and mechanisms, and its norms in an open-minded spirit. He has been
very much the prospector.
One cannot help but wonder about the source of Justice Scalia's
misconception. One possibility is that the Justice confused legal ethics with
judicial ethics, which, at the Supreme Court level, is not governed by rules, but at
best by the individual justice's understanding of "established principles and
practices." 54 But perhaps Justice Scalia was reminiscing on his own law-school
student days in the late 1950s, when lawy'ers' ethics may still have been the
province of boozy after-dinner speakers. 5 Or he may have conceived that
questions of professional conduct are resolved exclusively with reference to each
individual lawyer's personal ethical compass-that legal academics teach their
students to make ethical judgments, as some practitioners have been known to do,
by asking themselves such questions as, "how does it feel in my gut?," "does it
pass the 'smell test'?," or "how will I sleep at night if I act one way or another?" If
so, the Justice should have known better-lawyers are subject to ethics rules and
53. Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception, supra note 44, at
1531.
54. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 916 (2004).
55. Bob Gordon has referred to "the Law Day sermon and Bar Association after-
dinner speech-inspirational, boozily solemn, anything but real." Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 13 (1988). Whether Professor Gordon's
description fairly captures the nature of legal ethics discourse at mid-twentieth century
might be a subject of debate. But even by then, distinguished lawyers and academics had
made efforts to make legal ethics a subject of serious study. For example, John Dos Passos
(father of the novelist of the same name) wrote insightfully about the American lawyer in
1907. JOHN R. Dos PASSOS, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: As HE WAS-As HE Is-As HE CAN
BE (1907). Professor George Costigan, Jr., of Northwestern University published the first
casebook on legal ethics in 1917. GEORGE P. COSTIGAN, JR., CASES AND OTHER
AUTHORITIES ON LEGAL ETHICS (1917). Professor Henry Jessup of Columbia University
wrote about lawyers' professional ideals in 1925. HENRY WYNANS JESSUP, THE
PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAWYER: A STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS (1925). Professor Elliott
Cheatham, also of Columbia University, published a casebook on the legal profession in
1938. ELLIOTT E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1938).
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other law. Indeed, one reading Ted's article on the development of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct might note that Justice Scalia had a
peripheral role in the process; he engaged in special pleading on behalf of the
Administrative Law Section, which he chaired, urging that the conflict-of-interest
rules be liberalized for former government lawyers in private practice.
56
No responsible academic would suggest that lawyers can resolve
questions of professional conduct by ignoring professional regulation in favor of
their own subjective preferences. 57 As Ted once observed in the course of
defending legal ethics casebooks:
Lawyers in our society live in a sea of rules .... We can either
teach [law students] that morality is a separate, land-based realm or
teach them that they must find their moral bearings in that sea of
rules. If we imply that the professional codes are not worth intensive
study by anyone disposed to be virtuous-that legal ethics is to be
studied on land-then we should not be surprised if as lawyers they
disregard those codes and other legal rules as well, interpret rules
woodenly, use them cynically. If we teach them instead that rules
and moral judgment must and usually can be made to correspond,
that there is no escape to shore, then they may try harder to make
moral sense of the rules they encounter, including . . . the model
rules of professional conduct.58
If legal ethics professors think that they can be helpful to the Court in
cases involving questions of lawyer conduct, it is not because they are particularly
virtuous but because they make a living intensely studying their profession's
professional codes in relation to other law, actual practice, and common morality.
Ted's scholarship shows that one can tackle the normative side of lawyer
regulation as rigorously as any other body of law. He did so when the ABA Model
Rules were in draft, when he explored whether proposed revisions to ethics rules
solve the problems of interpretation and enforcement created by the then-existing
rules.59 These deficiencies, which had created the need for change, included
insufficient specificity regarding the desired professional conduct and ambiguity in
the relationship between the disciplinary rules and other law. He did so several
years later, when the Restatement provisions on the law of lawyering were in draft.
He questioned the wisdom of developing a rival normative code for legal practice,
and made a persuasive case that, in areas where the two sets of standards covered
56. Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics, supra note 7, at 716 & n.227.
57. Cf Schneyer, Professional Responsibility Casebooks and the New
Positivism, supra note 51, at 944 (discussing use of problem method in legal ethics
pedagogy to teach students how to apply ethics rules in concrete situations, how to
recognize the underlying policies, how to interpret them, how to reconcile them with moral
values and actual practice, and how to critique them); Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the
Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 12 (1991) ("[W]hy should we privilege lawyers' off-the-
job values over values forged in professional debate and practice?").
58. Schneyer, Professional Responsibility Casebooks and the New Positivism,
supra note 51, at 957.
59. Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and
Enforcement, supra note 1, at 952.
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the same ground, many of the contemplated Restatement provisions were
unjustified departures from the Model Rules.6 °
This is not to say that normative scholarship must invariably be practical.
As a self-described "academic lawyer with no formal training in moral philosophy
but a sustained interest in what moral philosophy can (and cannot) contribute to
normative legal ethics, ' 61 Ted has made a series of contributions to the normative
scholarship that explore the intersection of moral philosophy and legal ethics.62
But as the earlier-described work on the moral philosopher's standard
misconception illustrates, these writings are as objective and as rigorous as others.
Ted has not hesitated to challenge fellow academics who make
exaggerated or questionable claims,63 but it is plain that if there is a rigor deficit in
the field of legal ethics, it is not primarily on the side of the academy. The
organized bar's approach to questions of professional regulation often lacks the
level of objectivity, sharpness, and depth that one would expect of good lawyer
discourse. Bar leaders' resort to vague "professionalism" rhetoric, as in the
ancillary business debate, is one example that Ted has exposed.
Nor are the courts immune from criticism, as Ted demonstrated in a 1988
article titled "Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel,"
which offers a model of normative scholarship in the field. 64 The article examined
three bodies of state judge-made law regulating corporate in-house counsel: (1)
cases on whether in-house counsel may have access to information under a
protective order; (2) cases on whether insurance companies' staff attorneys may
defend policyholders; and (3) cases on whether in-house counsel may seek
compensation for wrongful discharge. Ted showed that judges in these cases made
various assumptions about in-house lawyers as compared with outside counsel-
about their relationships with the corporate clients and their non-lawyer officers,
their level of involvement in clients' business decisions, their susceptibility to
client pressure, and their job mobility-that are not self-evident, that are in some
cases inconsistent with each other, that lack empirical foundation, and that appear
60. Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and the ABA 's Model Rules, supra note
44.
61. Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the
Lawyer's Point of View, 16 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 45, 46 (2004).
62. See Schneyer, Fuzzy Models, supra note 34; Ted Schneyer, Reforming Law
Practice in the Pursuit of Justice: The Perils of Privileging "Public" over Professional
Values, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1831 (2002); Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun,
supra note 57; Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics, supra note 61.
63. See, e.g., Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception, supra note
44 (critiquing moral philosophers); Schneyer, Professional Responsibility Casebooks and
the New Positivism, supra note 51 (responding to criticism of legal ethics casebooks);
Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics, supra note 61 (critiquing Daniel
Markovits's article on the contemporary American bar).
64. Schneyer, Professionalism and Public Policy, supra note 27, at 457
("[S]cholars ... add a new strategy to the campaign to put professionalism in context. They
should analyze policy decisions in order to identify the decisionmakers' assumptions about
various practice settings, compare those assumptions with what is actually known, and bring
any discrepancies to light.").
20111 FOREWORD 377
to derive from tacit premises about in-house lawyers' status as professionals. 65 He
concluded that judges are "apt to approach the regulation of law practice in terms
of traditional professional principles tempered by their own notions about
professional status.",66 He assigned scholars the task of "foster[ing] a state of
affairs in which judges nonetheless base their policy decisions on solid evidence
about the pressures and temptation under which various types of lawyers work.",67
In other words, the problem of subjectivity in the field of legal ethics is on the
professional side; the academy's job is to ride to the rescue.
Having explicitly defended the position that legal ethics is a subject of
academic study at least as worthy of celebration as any other legal academic
subject, I hope that I have also shown that legal scholarship, especially on the
subject of legal ethics, should be celebrated. The body of legal ethics scholarship
speaks not only to academics who train future lawyers on this important subject
but to other institutions of the legal profession, including bar associations and the
judiciary, that play a central role in regulating lawyers. No one can make bar
leaders and judges read law review articles; unfortunately, there is hostility, or at
least skepticism, toward legal academic writing in some parts of the bench and bar.
But those who are open to legal ethics scholarship may be led to think
differently-more critically and more deeply-about how they and the institutions
they represent perform their functions as rule- and law-makers, interpreters and
enforcers of professional norms. And the scholarship can be influential in other
ways, including through the teaching and professional service of legal ethics
professors such as Ted, whose understandings are enhanced by participating in
scholarly reading, writing, and discussion.
And that brings me to the last question: why celebrate Ted's legal ethics
scholarship? By now, the answer should be obvious: Ted's body of work is
exemplary. 68 For scholars in the field, Ted's writings offer models for how to write
seriously about legal ethics. A new legal ethics professor can do no better than to
begin by sitting down with some of Ted's work in order to get an idea of the kinds
of questions one might ask and approaches one might adopt to answering them.
For lawyers and judges engaged in facets of the regulatory process, Ted's articles
offer models for how to think seriously about legal ethics.
65. Id. at 458-83.
66. Id. at 483; see also id. at 459 ("[T]he courts are making public policy on the
basis of findings which may again reflect nothing so much as the bar's ambivalence as to
whether house counsel are truly professionals.").
67. 1d. at 483; see also id. at 457 ("[Scholars] should analyze policy decisions in
order to identify the decisionmakers' assumptions about various practice settings, compare
those assumptions with what is actually known, and bring any discrepancies to light.").
68. There is another reason that one would not know simply from reading Ted's
writings, but that I have come to know by spending time with Ted and his wife, Kathy, in
the context of Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) drafting
committee meetings, ABA ethics committee meetings, and academic and professional
conferences. It is that there is no finer couple than the Schneyers; there is no more generous
teacher than Ted; there is no nicer guy. And so, I hope this festschrift is seen as a
celebration not only of Ted Schneyer the legal ethics scholar, but of Ted Schneyer the man.
On both counts, it is a very fitting celebration indeed.
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
We will need serious thinking in the days ahead, because the legal
profession will face hard regulatory questions, some of which Ted's writings
anticipate, others of which may be yet unforeseen. As law practice becomes
increasingly specialized and continues to branch into areas where lawyers compete
with other professionals, government agencies will continue to challenge state
judiciaries' dominant role in regulating law practice. The ABA is heady with its
recent success in beating back an attempt by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
to extend identity theft regulations to lawyers as creditors, 69 but there exists plenty
of other government regulation that the bar cannot seriously challenge, and there is
more to come.7 ° When lawyers serve as lobbyists, for example, they may (or may
not) be subject to the rules of professional conduct governing the lawyer-client
relationship and other aspects of law practice, 7 but even if so, lawyer-lobbyists
cannot seriously expect to be exempt from the specialized regulation governing
lobbyists generally. Will bar corporatism eventually become the favored ABA
response to the expansion of external regulation-if you can't beat 'em, join 'em?
Specialization and experimentation within the bar also put pressure on the
bar's traditional effort to centralize lawyer regulation by maintaining and enforcing
a single set of general legal ethics rules.72 Professional subgroups that regard their
regulatory issues as unique may come to welcome government agencies to develop
special regulatory rules and processes for them, as the large corporate law firms
have in the UK. Can the center hold? And at a time when the rising cost of a
legal education may make it unaffordable for new lawyers to represent low- and
middle-income clients, one can expect mounting pressure to liberalize"unauthorized practice of law" provisions that give lawyers a monopoly to practice
law. Should the bar meet challengers halfway by, for example, endorsing the
development of mechanisms to license and oversee nonlawyers, allowing them to
provide legal assistance within the limited areas for which they would be trained? 74
As the pace of change within the legal profession hastens, 7 5 an ever-
higher premium will be placed on critical, honest thinking about the profession.
69. Pursuant to 2003 legislation, the FTC established a Red Flags Rule requiring
creditors to adopt programs to prevent identity theft, and initially regarded lawyers as
creditors to whom the rule would apply. In August 2009, the ABA filed suit to prevent
enforcement of the rule and prevailed on a summary judgment motion. See Am. Bar Ass'n
v. FTC, 671 F. Supp. 2d 64, 66-67 (D.D.C. 2009). In late 2010, a law was enacted
exempting practicing lawyers from the rule. See Red Flag Program Clarification Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-319, 124 Stat. 3457 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(4)). This
success built on the ABA's earlier one in preventing the FTC's regulation of law practice
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. See Am. Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 458-59
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
70. See Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments, supra note 2, at
568-70.
71. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 344 (2008).
72. See Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement,
supra note 9, at 334-36.
73. Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility, supra note 6, at 27-28.
74. See Ted Schneyer, Introduction: The Future Structure and Regulation of
Law Practice, 44 ARIz. L. REv. 521, 523, 532 (2002).
75. See Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility, supra note 6, at 16-24.
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Unsubstantiated assumptions, vague rhetoric, and received wisdom about law
practice-often masking perceived professional self-interest-will lose force.76
Ted's writings deserve to be celebrated because, at this critical time in the legal
profession's history, they remind us of the importance of being rigorous.
76. Schneyer, Change and Persistence in the Bar President's Speech, supra note
43, at 1023 (observing in 1990 that "even in the face of the dramatic changes that are now
making law practice more businesslike, the bar clings to the fuzzy concept of
professionalism as its remedy of choice for whatever ails the legal system").

